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THE WHEAT POLL
DO WHEAT PRODUCERS FAVOR MANDATORY LIMITS ON PRODUCTION?
Edward Smith, Extension Economist-Grain Marketing andPoiicy
Mechei Paggi, Extension Economist-lnternationai Trade
JamesRichardson, Professor, Texas Agricultural Experiment Station
Ronald D. Knutson, Extension Economist-Policy and Marketing, and Professor
Texas A&M University System
Wheat producers in the U.S. will soon receive a ballot
from USDA asking a question similar to that posed in the
title of this article. The poll is beingconductedas one of the
requirements of the Food Security Act of 1985 (farm bill).
The outcome of the poll, however, does not bind the Secre
tary of Agriculture to establish mandatory controls.
The 1985 farm bill states, "Not laterthanJuly1,1986,
the Secreta^ ofAgriculture shall conduct a poll, by mail
ballot, of eligible producers of wheat to determine whether"
suchproducers favor the imposition ofmandatory limits on
theproduaionofwheat thatwill result inwheat prices that
are notlower than 125% ofthecost ofproduction (excluding
land and residual returns tomanagement) as determined by
the Secretary." Only those producers who have grown
wheat in at least one crop year from 1981-1985 on a farm
with a wheat base ofat least 40acres will beeligible to vote.
Although this poll is non-binding, it should not be
taken lightly. Its inclusion inthefarm bill reflects agrowing
demand for mandatory production controls byproducers in
the wheat industry as well as other producer groups
frustrated by surplus production and low farm prices.
Producers, therefore, must consider the many consequences
before answering this simple question.
This article explores the question of mandatory
production controls as well as other supply-management
alternatives and their consequences for wheat producers.
The purpose of this article is to provide wheat producers
with information that should be considered in their decision
on how to vote. Of course, the discussion in this article
focuses on the implications of supply control and does not
suggest how a producer should vote in the poll.
Before Making the Decision
Most producers would like to have answers to a
number of questions before voting "yes" or "no" on
mandatory production controls. Some questions toconsider
include:
• What does the Secretary of Agriculture consider to
be the cost of wheat production?
• What quantities of wheat would be sold if prices
were increased to 125% of this cost of production?
• How much will production need to be cut to
maintain theprice at 125% ofthecost ofproduction?
• What mandatory supply-management options are
available?
• What are the consequences of continuing with the
current farm program?
These are not easy questions to answer. We consider
thefollowing analysis reasonable, given available information.
What is the Cost ofProducing Wheat?
There probably areas many answers tothis question as
there are wheat producers. USDA, however, is required by
Congress to estimate the cost of producing wheat, feed
grains, cotton, anddairy commodities each year. Based on
previous USDA cost of production estimates, we estimate
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A mail ballot asking producers if they favor
mandatory production controls will be sent
out around the middle of June. This is not
the same as the marketing quota referendum
which must be completed by August 1, 1986.
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Mandatory Acreage Controls
Mandatory acreage controls or allotments would
allow wheat production on a specific number of acres
allotted to each farm based on its share of the national
allotment necessary to meet the Administration's supply-
management objectives. Acreage allotments were used
extensively in the 1950's and 60's and still exist in tobacco.
Experience has shown that when acreage allotments
areused,in the absence ofmarketing quotas, the program
is ineffective in limiting production to the desired level.
Farmers select their best acreage and farm the allotted
acreage more intensively. The result is increased produc
tion per acre,requiringfurther tightening ofthe allotment
in future years.
If the Secretary determined, as in our analysis, that
57% of the wheat base would have to be removed from
grainproduction tomeet theneeds ofthemarket at aprice
of S4.04/bushel, farmers might only be allowed to plant
wheat for grain on 43% of their allotted acreage. The
question that immediately surfaces is, "What can we do
with the idled acreage?" Allowances for use of the idled
acreage become extremely important to producers in
determining their preference for this type of mandatory
program.
The rules for transfer of the allotment are also very
important. If the allotment is tied to the land and non-
transferable, then the price of land tends to be bid-up. If
allotments aretransferable, thenanyprofits resulting from
the allotmentwillbe quicklycapitalizedinto the allotment's
value. Is the landowner better off? The answer depends
againon whathe cando withhis idledacreage. Ifthe idled
acres can be profitably farmed, then the producer would
gain from the capitalized value of the allotment as well as
from the earnings oh wheat. If the idled acres cannot be
farmed, the capitalized value of the allotment must be
offset against the reduced value of land that cannot be
farmed and the cost of controlling weeds and erosion on
the idled land.
Allotments tied to a specific crop tend to restria the
farmer's ability toadjust crop mixes inresponse tochanges
in relative crop prices. If idled acreage is allowed to be
planted to alternative crops, furthermore, it could result in
surpluses for non-allotment crops, thus tending to force
these producers to elea allotments for their crops.
Thebottom line is thatfarmers are notautomatically
better offfrom mandatory acreage controls. Whether they
are better off depends on the rules of the game and each
specific situation. At this point, we do not know the rules
under which mandatory controls would operate.
Marketing Quotas
It is not surprising that the 1985 farm.bill, under its,
wheat title, has a marketing quota section immediately
following the section requiring the "Wheat Poll." A
marketing quota is a mandatory mechanism which deter
mines the quantity of a commodity that can be marketed.
The national quota, set by the Secretary of Agriculture, is
based on the quantity of wheat necessary to meet the
expected market needs, taking into consideration domestic
. A
and export requirements as well as emergency food aid \
heeds and adequate carryover stocks.
After the establishment of the national quota, the
Secretary wouldassigna marketing quota for eachfarm on
whichwheatwas plantedor consideredplantedforharvest
' during the 1981-1985 base period. The marketing quota
wouldbe equal to the product derived by multiplying the
farm's baseacreage byits farmprogramyieldand reduced
by the appropriatepercentage necessary to bring national
marketing down to the level of national quota. Penalties
would be assessed to producers who marketed wheat
beyond their assigned quotas.
The Secretary has the authority to announce a
marketing quota for wheat to cover the crop years 1987-
1990. To implement a quota under the 1985 farm bill
provisions,the Secretarymust proclaimthe nationalwheat
quota by June 15, 1986. He must also conduct, by mail
ballot, a marketing quota referendum by August 1, 1986.
This referendum is separate from the non-binding poll
conducted in June, which is the topicof this paper. The
Secretary may proclaim that marketing quotas areineffect
for 1987-1990 if he determines that 60% or more of the
eligible producers, voting in the referendum, approved
marketing quotas. According to the 1985 farm bill, the
national quota could be terminated or adjusted in any
marketing year the Secretary determines there exists a
national emergency or there has been a material change in
the demand for wheat. Our analysis indicates that a
reduction inexport andfeed use demand would be likely.
Previous experience with supply control programs
indicates that marketing quotas are the most effective
means ofcontrolling production because there is virtually
no slippage. Quotas are, however, hard to maintain
because ofpolitical pressure to increase thenational quota
once it is established.
As was the case with acreage allotments, the use of
idled cropland is a big factor in a producer's decision to
favor a marketing quota. Many ofthesame consequences
may apply.
In thecase ofmandatory acreage controls ormarketing
quotas, the incidence of government involvement in
agriculture is high. In terms of taxpayerdollars,however,
mandatory programs are relatively inexpensive supply-
management alternatives.
What Are the Consequences
Of Continuing the Current Program?
The current program calls for voluntary compliance
in announced acreage reduction programs in return for
direct government income support (deficiency) payments
and access to price support loans. In addition, authoriza
tion exists for a 45 million acre conservation reserve.
Voluntary acreage limitations call for different levels
of idled acreage each -year, depending on the projected
carryovers. If carryover stocks are expected to exceed 1
billion bushels (highly likely for the next few years), the
annual acreage reduction requirement will be between
20-30% (20-27.5%) in 1987 of base acreage. If stocks are
expected to be less than 1 billion bushels, the acreage
reduction requirements would be not more than 20%.
tKe national average cost ofproducing wheat (excluding land
and residual returns to management) to be about $3.23/
bushel. The objective of a mandatory production control
program, therefore, would be to raise the price of wheat to
about $4.04/bushel (1.25 times $3.23/bushel).
How Much Wheat Can Be Sold?
The answer tothis question is vital toouranalysis since
it determines the level ofproduction necessary tosustain a
$4.04/bushel market-price. Unfortunately, there is no
simple answer. The quantity ofwheat sold at $4.04/bushel
•will depend onamyriad offaaorsaffecting thedomestic and
export sectors. Due to the importance of the answer to this
question, further examination of these sectors is warranted.
Domestic Use
Domestic wheat utilization can be categorized into
three components: food, seed, and feed. As shown in
Figure 1, the major domestic use of wheat is in the food
sector. Wheat for food use, however, has been virtually
non-responsive to price. Food demand, thus, would be
expected to decline only moderately to approximately 650
millionbushels if price is increased to 14.04/bushel to the
farmer.
Seed use is a fimction ofplanted acreage and seeding
rate. The planted acreage will vary depending on such
faaors as grain needs, livestock grazing needs, wheat's use as
acover aop onaaes idledimdergovernment programs, and
wheat's importance in double aopping systems. For the
purpose ofthis malysis, we assume seed usage at 70 million
bushels, down 22% from 1985 leyels.
Feed use has varied over the last several years (Figure
1) depending on the price relationship between wheat and
competing feed grains. If mandatory produaion controls
were implemented for wheat irrespective ofthe feed grain
seaor, it is likely that the amount of wheat used as feed
would drop significantly. For the purpose ofthis analysis,
we assume annual feed use to decline to 90 million bushels.
Export Use
Since the early 70's when the dollar was allowed to
float relative to other currencies, the export seaor has
traditionally absorbed more wheat than the domestic
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market. USDA's estimate of 900 million bushels for the
1985/86 marketing year marks the first time since 1971
that importers will demand less U.S. wheat than the
domestic seaor. The decline in exports (Figure 1) has
occurred because of: a strong U.S. dollar, U.S. price
support levels (loan rates) exceeding world market levels,
foreign coinpetition, and aheavy debt load in many develop
ing countries.
The export wheat market is highly competitive. An
increase in the U.S. wheat price would place the United
States soundly in the position ofa residual supplier. A
conservative response to a U.S. price increase to $4.04/
bushel would result in a drop in exports to 750 million
bushels.
This analysis suggests that the total demandfor U.S.
wheat could fall by 21% from 1985 levels to approximately
1.56 billion bushels ifU.S. wheat prices were supported at
$4.04/bushel.
How Much Would Production Need to Be Cut?
In 1985, U.S. wheat producers harvested 2.43 billion
bushels from 64.7 niillion acres. Ignoring, for the moment,
record levels of carryover (Figure 1), the United States
would have to reduce wheat production by about 36% to
meet the 1.56 billion bushel demand estimated in the
previous section. Further reduction would be necessary, in
the short run, ifthe wheat already in government storage
were allowed to enter the market.
Assuming minimal production control program
slippage (slippage is that portion ofreduced acreage which
does not result in correspondingly lower production, e.g.,
due toidling thepoorest land) resulting ina39 bushel/acre
average yield, theprojeaed demand of1.56 billion bushels
could be produced on 40.0 million harvested acres—only
43% ofthe wheat base for 1986. Inother words, 57%ofthe
wheat base would need to be removed from grain produc
tion to support a market clewing price of$4.04/bushel.
What Mandatory Supply
Control Options Are Available?
Mandatory production control programs can take
many forms. This discussion, however, will focus on
mandatoiy acreage controls and marketing quotas. The
analysis in the previous section applies to eitlicr form of
produaion control.
USDA may take the position that even if an over
whelming majority of the farmers vote in favor of
mandatory produaion controls, ithas no authority to imple
ment them. The 1985 farm bill contains authority for
establishing marketing quotas in wheat. USDA's position
could be that from alegal perspeaive, marketing controls
(quotas) are not production controls. However, under
conditions of asufficiently overwhelming favorable vote,
the marketing quota authority in the 1985 farm bill might
still be utilized. Alternatively, Congress could enact new
legislation authorizing acreage allotments or providing
legal interpretation of marketing quotas as a tool for
controlling production.
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Theconservation reserve program provides for up to
45million acres oflandbeingtakenoutofproduction fora
10 year period. Available USDA data suggest that about
25% of this land (11.3 million acres) would have wheat
base. This is about 22%ofthe land that would be taken out
of grain production under a mandatory control program
that was designed to raise the price of wheat to $4.04/
bushel. The main question surrounding the conservation
reserve program is whether the money is going to be
appropriated to remove45 millionacresfrom production.
With potential Gramm-Rudmann-Hollings budget cut
restrictions on funding, this program could suffer.
Continuation of the current farm program would
likely result in farm level prices being determined by the
loanrateforthe next few years. In addition, the presence of
large carryover stocks would likely lead to further reduc
tions in the loan rate based on the loan rate formula in the
1985 farm bill. It would be difficult for the market to
absorb the expected 1.88 billion bushels of stocks on hand
asofJune 1,1986,withthe acreage reductionrequirements
called for in the farm bill. Voluntary acreage reduction
programs have never been a very effective tool for control
ling production due to slippage.
A policy scenario which could lead to different price
results involves the implementation of a wheat marketing
loan by the Secretary, which is authorized in the 1985farm
\
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bill. Initial indications arethatinrice, where themarketing
loan is currently ineffect, exports increase as market prices
fall to the world price level. Government payments
initially rise sharply, offsetting the fall in market price.
Once stocks are drawn down, however, market prices
should rise above current levels.Regardless of whether the
marketing loan is used, the current program will be
relatively costly to the U.S. treasury.
Conclusions
The "Wheat Poll," althoughnon-binding, couldhave
important implications for future wheat programs. The
market says we have overproduced. Effectively managed
mandatory production controls provide anorderly way to
get resources out of agriculture.
The decision to vote in favor or against mandatory
production controls is multi-faceted. Producers must
consider the short- and long-run consequencesof manda
tory supply controls versus the current program. The basic
choice is between the current voluntary program with
relatively highgovernment costs and lower market prices
and a mandatory program that costs less but could result in
relatively higher prices, lower export and feed demand,
and considerably lower production. In anyevent,as inany
political issue, it is important that farmers make their
preference known.
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